*For additional information regarding the criterion for inclusion or membership for lawyer associations, awards, & certifications click image for link.

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees defendants charged with a crime the right to legal counsel. The North Carolina State Constitution reinforces that protection in Article I, Section 23 Declaration of Rights. A lot of folks facing a criminal allegation assume that legal right is absolute. As long as they want an attorney, the Court must provide one. That’s not always the case. Indeed, there are things you can do to lose your right to a lawyer.

TL;DRThe February 2026 NC Court of Appeals Decision, State v. Webber, upheld a trial judge’s decision to strip a defendant of the right to counsel and force them to stand trial alone. The defendant had burned through four appointed attorneys over several years, privately retained a fifth, refused court-appointed counsel, and walked into the courtroom on the day of trial without a lawyer. The Court found the defendant forfeited and otherwise waived the right to counsel through their conduct.

North Carolina courts look at the totality of circumstances before stripping a defendant of the right to counsel. No single act automatically triggers forfeiture. What follows are the seven patterns set forth in Webber that, alone or in combination, can cost a defendant their lawyer:

Jury selection in North Carolina criminal cases follows a structured process governed by state statute, and what happens during “voir dire” can shape the outcome of a trial in ways that are not always visible to defendants sitting at the defense table. The decision about who sits on a jury ordinarily involves multiple rounds of questioning, different types of legal challenges, and procedural protocols. When something unexpected happens during jury selection, such as a juror raising a concern about fairness after already being selected for the jury panel, the law provides steps for how courts and lawyers respond. Understanding how things work can matter if you’re facing a criminal charge in North Carolina.

TL;DR Jury selection in North Carolina criminal cases involves two distinct types of challenges, challenges for cause and peremptory challenges, each governed by separate statutory procedures. When a juror raises a concern after being accepted, the law under N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15A-1214(g) provides a specific process for addressing concerns, including the possibility of reopening voir dire. Whether a defendant can later challenge a jury selection decision on appeal may depend on exhausting available peremptory challenges.

Bill Powers has helped clients in North Carolina for more than thirty years. Bill enjoys teaching and hosting continuing legal education programs. If you are facing a serious criminal charge in North Carolina, such as Misdemeanor Death by Vehicle or Felony Serious Injury or Felony Death by Vehicle involving DUI charges, and have questions about how the trial process works, please call Bill Powers and the criminal defense team at Powers Law Firm at 704-342-4357 to schedule a consultation.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals filed State v. Alston, No. COA25-291, on February 18, 2026, resolving an appeal arising from a driving-while-impaired conviction entered upon an Alford plea in Alamance County Superior Court. The opinion addresses two distinct issues that arise regularly in DWI defense practice:

  1. What the totality-of-the-circumstances standard actually demands when a defendant challenges the facial validity of a probable cause determination based on officer observations?
  2. What appellate rights survive when a defendant enters a guilty or Alford plea without first cataloguing every intended issue to preserve?

State v. Allison  (December 12, 2025) represents the North Carolina Supreme Court’s definitive statement that self-defense jury instructions in castle doctrine cases must track the statutory decision tree rather than collapsing into a traditional common law reasonableness analysis. 

TL;DR: North Carolina’s castle doctrine under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 operates through statutory presumptions governing the lawfulness of deadly force at homes, porches, and curtilage, and these presumptions dictate jury analysis. The state Supreme Court has enforced this statutory framework by reversing convictions in State v. Phillips and State v. Allison where jury instructions collapsed the castle doctrine into generic common law self-defense instead of following the statute’s presumption-driven structure, establishing that such instructional failures constitute reversible error.

Bill Powers is a past President of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice and a recipient of the North Carolina State Bar’s John B. McMillan Distinguished Service Award for service to the profession. The defense attorneys at Powers Law Firm represent clients statewide in cases involving serious felonies, including homicide charges, assault with a deadly weapon, and self-defense claims under both common law and North Carolina’s castle doctrine statute. For questions about self-defense jury instructions, statutory presumptions under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2, or appellate issues in criminal cases, contact Powers Law Firm at 704-342-4357 to schedule a confidential consultation.

Issue North Carolina Rule
Castle doctrine trigger Lawful occupancy of home/vehicle + unlawful forcible entry or attempted entry.
Presumption created Reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm is conclusively presumed by statute.
Jury’s role Jury does NOT decide if fear was reasonable—statute supplies that element automatically.
State’s burden Prove beyond reasonable doubt that a rebuttal circumstance under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c) exists.
Protected locations Home, motor vehicle, workplace, and curtilage (area immediately surrounding home).
Instruction requirement Must follow statutory presumption structure—cannot collapse into common law reasonableness.
Failure to instruct properly Reversible error requiring new trial (State v. Phillips, State v. Allison).

Castle Doctrine Jury Instructions in North Carolina | Statutory Presumption Structure and Reversible Error Under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2

The Court reversed a conviction and ordered a new trial because the jury instructions failed to properly explain the castle doctrine’s presumption and rebuttal structure, including the definition of curtilage as part of the statutorily protected area.

The significance lies not in the outcome alone but in the Court’s explicit insistence that jury instructions follow statutory sequencing. When evidence supports application of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 (castle doctrine), jurors must be instructed that a presumption arises by operation of law.

 If the defendant establishes the statutory trigger facts (lawful occupancy of a home or motor vehicle, and an unlawful and forcible entry or attempted entry by another person), then reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm is conclusively presumed. The jury does not decide whether the defendant’s fear was reasonable. The statute supplies that element.

The State’s burden shifts to rebuttal. Once the presumption applies, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the rebuttal circumstances in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c) exists. 

Those circumstances are exhaustive. The jury cannot reject the defense based on free-form judgments about proportionality, alternative options, or subjective fear.

Curtilage is also part of the protected location. 

North Carolina law protects a home, motor vehicle, or workplace. Curtilage (the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home) falls within the statutory definition of home. Failure to instruct on curtilage when the evidence supports a finding that the encounter occurred in that area deprives the defendant of the statutory protection and is reversible error.

As such, statutory sequencing is not a technicality. It is the substantive law of self-defense in cases where the castle doctrine in North Carolina applies.

How Location Determines Self-Defense Law in North Carolina | Castle Doctrine, Stand Your Ground, and Common Law Frameworks

North Carolina now has three overlapping self-defense frameworks, each triggered by different factual predicates. Traditional self-defense under common law applies when neither the castle doctrine nor stand-your-ground statute governs. The defendant must prove both that force was necessary to prevent imminent harm and that the force used was not excessive. The State can attack both necessity and proportionality. As an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proving the defense.

Castle doctrine under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 applies when the encounter occurs in or at the threshold of a home (including curtilage), motor vehicle, or workplace, and involves an unlawful and forcible entry. 

The presumption of reasonable fear is statutorily provided. The jury’s role is thereafter limited to determining whether the statutory trigger facts exist and whether the State has proven a rebuttal circumstance. Proportionality analysis is replaced entirely by the statutory presumptio of reasonable fear.

The Stand Your Ground Law in North Carolina (N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3) applies when a defendant is lawfully present in a location and reasonably believes force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. 

There is no duty to retreat before using force. 

While the Stand Your Ground statute generally applies more broadly than the castle doctrine (it is not limited to homes, vehicles, or workplaces), it does not create a presumption of reasonable fear. The defendant must still prove that force was necessary, but need not prove the attempt to retreat or avoid a violent confrontation.

The critical litigation decision facing criminal defense lawyers involves identifying which legal framework governs the case. That determination may depend on where the encounter takes place, whether the location qualifies as a statutorily protected area, and whether the encounter involves forcible entry.

Evidence establishing that the encounter occurred on the defendant’s porch, in the yard immediately adjacent to the home, or at the threshold of the residence may serve for something more that context. It can be legally determinative, as it may trigger the castle doctrine’s presumption.

Curtilage and the Castle Doctrine in North Carolina | Dunn Factors, Self-Defense Location Analysis, and Jury Instruction Requirements

Allison’s emphasis on curtilage reflects a practical reality. A fair number of self-defense encounters occur at a wide range of different locations (including driveways, yards, porches, sidewalks near the home). Whether such locales may qualify as curtilage, thereby determining whether the castle doctrine even applies.

Curtilage is defined by reference to four factors derived from United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987)

  • Proximity of the area to the home
  • Whether the area is within an enclosure surrounding the home
  • The nature and uses to which the area is put
  • Steps taken to protect the area from observation by passersbys

The Dunn factors are not merely mechanical tests. They may guide a totality-of-circumstances analysis focused on whether the area is soconnected to the home that it should receive the same Fourth Amendment and statutory protections.

For self-defense legal issues in North Carolina, curtilage determinations require factual development and specific jury findings. Evidence relevant to curtilage may include things like:

  • Photographs or diagrams showing the layout of the property and the location of the encounter
  • Testimony about how the defendant used the area (as part of daily domestic activity, as a private outdoor space, as a protected entryway)
  • Evidence of fencing, gates, landscaping, or other physical indicators of boundaries
  • Distance measurements from the encounter location to the home’s structure.

If the evidence supports a curtilage finding, the trial court must define curtilage for the jury and permit the jury to determine whether the encounter occurred within that protected area. Omission of this instruction, as Allison held, also serves as reversible error.

Rebuttal Circumstances Under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c) | State’s Burden and Proportionality Arguments in Castle Doctrine Cases

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c) limits the State’s ability to defeat the castle doctrine presumption to proof of any one of the following circumstances: 

  • The person against whom force was used had the lawful right to be in the home, motor vehicle, or workplace (a co-resident, invited guest, or person with a property interest)
  • The person against whom force was used was attempting to remove a child or grandchild in lawful custody
  • The person using force was engaged in criminal activity or using the premises to further criminal activity
  • The person against whom force was used was a law-enforcement officer entering or attempting to enter in the lawful performance of official duties.

These categories are exhaustive in nature. The State cannot defeat the presumption by arguing that the defendant used excessive force, had time to retreat, could have called police, or subjectively overreacted. Those arguments are therefore foreclosed once the statutory trigger facts are established.

That may creates a powerful litigation strategy for defense counsel. 

Once the castle doctrine applies, the defense’s role is to prevent the State from re-introducing proportionality or duty-to-retreat concepts through jury instructions or closing argument. Any instruction that permits the jury to evaluate reasonableness beyond the statutory rebuttal framework violates Allison.

Stand Your Ground in North Carolina | N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3 

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3 operates differently from the castle doctrine. It does not create a presumption. It eliminates the duty to retreat that previously existed under common law when a person was attacked in a public place.

Under the NC stand your ground law, the defendant must still prove:

  • Lawful presence in the location where force was used
  • Reasonable belief that force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm
  • That the force used was not excessive under the circumstances

The statute’s substantive effect is to remove retreat as a factor in evaluating whether force was necessary and appropriate. A defendant who otherwise satisfies the elements of self-defense no longer loses the the defense simply because retreat was conceptually possible.

That technical, but important distinction matters relative to the jury instructions. 

Stand Your Ground jury instructions in North Carolina eliminate references to duty to retreat but still require the jury to evaluate necessity and proportionality. Castle doctrine instructions, in contrast, replace the necessity and proportionality analysis with a statutory, rebuttal presumption. 

Pretrial Immunity Hearings Under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 and § 14-51.3 | Preponderance Standard, Dismissal Strategy, and Fifth Amendment Testimonial Risks

Both the castle doctrine and stand your ground laws in North Carolina include important immunity provisions. A defendant who establishes the defense is immune from both criminal prosecution and civil liability. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(e); § 14-51.3(b).

Immunity may be appropriately asserted in a pretrial motion. Proof of legal immunity requires only a preponderance of the evidence, and if so proven the charges may be dismissed in appropriate circumstances. 

Immunity hearings therefore can become a critical pretrial battleground in violent felony charges. A successful immunity showing may eliminate the case entirely, avoiding trial and the potential risk of conviction.

The defendant bears the burden of proving the statutory trigger facts (lawful occupancy, unlawful entry, or lawful presence and reasonable belief of necessity). If the defendant satisfies that burden, the castle doctrine presumption applies, and the State must prove a rebuttal circumstance or, in stand your ground cases, the defendant must prove the remaining elements (necessity, proportionality). 

The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not), not beyond a reasonable doubt.

Effective immunity litigation therefore often requires affirmative evidence presentation, not cross-examination of State witnesses alone. 

Defense counsel may want to present testimony from the defendant or other witnesses establishing: 

  • The factual predicates for immunity
  • Physical evidence, photographs, or diagrams showing the encounter location and relevant spatial relationships
  • Expert testimony if necessary to establish factors such as curtilage or the nature of the threat faced
  • Documentary evidence (lease agreements, property records) establishing lawful occupancy or presence

Immunity hearings also create the potential for certain strategic risks. The defendant may be required to testify and present evidence to satisfy the burden of proof. That testimony and evidence, with the associated waiver of Fifth Amendment Rights, thereafter become available to the State for impeachment purposes in the event immunity is denied and the case proceeds to trial.

Defense counse is therefore called to evaluate whether the likelihood of prevailing at the immunity hearing justifies the disclosure of the defendant’s theory and evidence on a pretrial motion basis, or whether tactically preserving that information for trial outweighs the benefit of potential immunity.

Self-Defense Law in North Carolina | Common Questions About Castle Doctrine, Stand Your Ground, and Immunity

What's the difference between castle doctrine and stand your ground in North Carolina?

Castle doctrine under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 creates a statutory presumption of reasonable fear when someone unlawfully and forcibly enters your home, vehicle, or workplace. The jury doesn’t evaluate whether your fear was reasonable—the statute supplies that element automatically. Stand your ground under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3 eliminates the duty to retreat but doesn’t create a presumption. You must still prove that force was necessary and not excessive, though you don’t have to show you tried to run away first. The castle doctrine is stronger because it shifts the burden to the State to prove one of the limited rebuttal circumstances, while stand your ground still requires you to prove necessity and proportionality.

Does my front porch or driveway count as part of my home for self-defense purposes?

Curtilage, the area immediately surrounding and associated with your home, ordinarily falls within the statutory definition of home under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2. Courts apply four factors from United States v. Dunn to determine whether an area qualifies as curtilage: proximity to the home, whether it’s within an enclosure, how you use the area, and steps taken to protect it from observation. Your porch, driveway, or yard may qualify as curtilage depending on fencing, gates, landscaping, distance from the structure, and whether you use the area for daily domestic activity. If the evidence supports a curtilage finding, the trial court must instruct the jury on curtilage, and failure to do so constitutes reversible error under State v. Allison.

Can my criminal charges get dismissed before trial if I acted in self-defense?

Immunity hearings under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(e) and § 14-51.3(b) allow defendants to seek pretrial dismissal by proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. If you establish the statutory trigger facts, such as lawful occupancy and unlawful forcible entry for castle doctrine, or lawful presence and reasonable belief of necessity for stand your ground, and the State cannot prove a rebuttal circumstance, the charges may be dismissed entirely. The strategic risk involves testifying at the immunity hearing, which waives Fifth Amendment protections and makes that testimony available to the State for impeachment if immunity is denied and the case proceeds to trial.

What can the State argue to defeat my castle doctrine defense?

Rebuttal circumstances under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c) are exhaustive and limited to four scenarios: the person had a lawful right to be there (co-resident, invited guest, property interest holder), the person was attempting to remove a child or grandchild in lawful custody, you were engaged in criminal activity or using the premises to further criminal activity, or the person was a law-enforcement officer lawfully performing official duties. The State cannot defeat the presumption by arguing you used excessive force, had time to retreat, could have called police, or subjectively overreacted. Those proportionality and duty-to-retreat arguments are foreclosed once the statutory trigger facts are established.

What happens if the jury instructions don't properly explain the castle doctrine?

Improper jury instructions that collapse the castle doctrine into generic common law self-defense constitute reversible error requiring a new trial under State v. Allison and State v. Phillips. When evidence supports application of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2, the trial court must instruct jurors that a presumption arises by operation of law, explain the statutory trigger facts, define curtilage when relevant, and limit the State’s rebuttal to the exhaustive circumstances in subsection (c). Instructions that permit the jury to evaluate reasonableness beyond the statutory rebuttal framework violate Allison because statutory sequencing is substantive law, not a technicality.

Castle Doctrine Defense in North Carolina | Statutory Compliance, Jury Instruction Precision, and Trial-Level Execution

Self-defense litigation under North Carolina’s castle doctrine turns on statutory compliance and precise jury instruction rather than abstract reasonableness debates. State v. Allison establishes that trial courts must follow the statutory presumption structure when evidence supports application of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2, including proper instruction on curtilage, the burden-shifting framework, and the exhaustive nature of rebuttal circumstances. Effective defense advocacy requires identifying which self-defense framework governs based on location and the nature of the encounter, developing factual evidence supporting curtilage findings when relevant, and preventing the State from reintroducing common law proportionality concepts that the statute displaces. Immunity hearings offer pretrial dismissal opportunities but require strategic evaluation of the testimonial risks against the potential for case elimination before trial.

Bill Powers brings more than three decades of North Carolina trial experience to serious criminal charges. As a past President of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice and recipient of the North Carolina State Bar’s John B. McMillan Distinguished Service Award for service to the profession. The defense attorneys at Powers Law Firm represent clients statewide in cases involving serious felonies, self-defense claims, and immunity hearings under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 and § 14-51.3. For questions about castle doctrine jury instructions, curtilage determinations, pretrial immunity strategy, or appellate review of self-defense cases, contact Powers Law Firm at 704-342-4357 to schedule a confidential consultation.

DUI checkpoints remain constitutionally permissible under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution, provided they satisfy the balancing test articulated in federal and state precedent and comply with the procedural safeguards in N.C.G.S. § 20-16.3A

That principle is settled law and has been for quite some time. 

What is not settled, and what may determine suppression outcomes in individual cases, is whether a specific license checkpoint or “DWI checking station” satisfies those requirements in practice. Recent Court of Appeals authority confirms that checkpoint suppression litigation turns on evidentiary record development and trial court fact-finding, not on abstract constitutional arguments.

House Bill 307, known as Iryna’s Law, took effect December 1, 2025, and represents perhaps the most significant statutory reform to North Carolina’s pretrial release framework in decades. 

The legislation emerged in response to a high-profile homicide in Charlotte and puts into effect sweeping changes to bail procedures, pretrial detention authority, and judicial oversight of release decisions.

The law’s core mechanism is the creation of rebuttable presumptions against the release of defendants charged with specified violent offenses or who have prior violent-offense records. Presumptions shift the baseline inquiry from “why should this defendant be detained,” to “why should this defendant be released despite the statutory presumption.”

State v. Rogers examines the relationship between constitutional violations and judicial remedies regarding suppressing evidence in North Carolina, focusing on when unlawfully obtained evidence should be excluded and when statutory good-faith principles may permit the admission of objectively unlawfully obtained evidence (in violation of statutory or constitutional precepts) despite a defect in the underlying search.

By construing N.C.G.S. § 15A-974 to permit admission of evidence obtained through conduct later determined to be unlawful when officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on existing legal authority, the NC Supreme Court shifts suppression analysis away from a purely rights-based inquiry and toward a somewhat more remedial framework grounded in objective reasonableness and deterrence. The decision operates as a judicial construction that narrows the practical suppression issues long associated with Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution.

TL;DR Suppression litigation in North Carolina now turns less on abstract constitutional violations and more on the objective reasonableness of governmental reliance on external legal authority, the legal landscape confronting officers at the time judicial authorization was obtained, and whether exclusion would meaningfully deter future misconduct. Trial courts must therefore evaluate institutional knowledge, training, warrant practice, and the accuracy and completeness of information presented to judicial officials, rather than roadside judgments made without judicial involvement. For defense counsel, effective advocacy requires disciplined factual development capable of rebutting asserted good-faith reliance grounded in warrants, statutes, or court authorization, rather than reliance on doctrinal violation alone.

If you are facing criminal charges in North Carolina, recent court decisions may directly affect what evidence your lawyer can obtain and how quickly that evidence becomes available. One of the most important of these rulings is State v. Chemuti, a decision that changes how body-camera and dash-camera recordings are requested, reviewed, and used in criminal cases.

Access to law-enforcement video can shape suppression motions, plea negotiations, and trial strategy. When that access is delayed or restricted, the balance of a criminal case may shift in ways that are difficult to correct later. Understanding how discovery works after Chemuti is therefore part of protecting your legal rights from the earliest stage of a prosecution.

For questions about criminal discovery, suppression issues, or how recent North Carolina case law may affect your defense, Bill Powers is available for legal consultation at Powers Law Firm. Call 704-342-4357 to schedule a confidential consultation. Bill Powers is a trial lawyer with more than three decades of courtroom experience handling criminal defense matters in North Carolina, a past President of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice, and a recipient of the James B. McMillan Distinguished Service Award.

This guide explains how North Carolina prosecutors and defense lawyers analyze death by vehicle charges, proximate cause, and charging discretion in impaired-driving fatalities

1. The Case May Reach the Prosecutor Long After the Train Has Left the Station

In some North Carolina jurisdictions, prosecutors learn about fatal crashes well after law enforcement has already made critical decisions. Pre-COVID charging decisions in some districts, such as in Mecklenburg County, generally involved officers consulting with the District Attorney’s office before charging in death-by-vehicle cases. That practice ended in many jurisdictions, though it continues in others. Prosecutors may receive case files only after arrest warrants have been issued, charges have been filed, and media coverage has begun. In other prosecutorial districts, prosecutors become involved at the scene and participate directly in the initial charging decision.

Mecklenburg County bond hearings follow the North Carolina pretrial release law, yet the way those bond hearings are scheduled, reviewed, and decided in Charlotte reflects the size of the 26th Judicial District, the structure of its felony dockets, and recent statutory changes (Iryna’s Law) that raised the bar for release in certain categories of cases. The result is a process that is more structured and, to some extent, substantively different from those in many other counties.

The statutory framework governing bond hearings changed materially with the enactment of House Bill 307, commonly known as Iryna’s Law, which took effect in North Carolina on December 1, 2025. That legislation revised the pretrial release statutes and expanded the set of cases in which judges begin from the position that release is not appropriate unless the defense provides credible information to the contrary. For defined violent offenses and certain repeat or high-risk charge patterns set out by statute, the law now directs the Court (the Judge) to apply a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure both court appearance and public safety. As a practical matter, that change did not eliminate bond hearings, yet it altered their starting point. Instead of asking what conditions are sufficient for release, the Court must first decide whether the presumption against release has been overcome.

That presumption is not rhetorical or merely symbolic. It functions as a rule of decision that shifts the practical burden at a Mecklenburg County bond hearing. Defense counsel no longer argues, in every instance, from a neutral baseline that favors the least-restrictive release. The hearing instead begins with the court directed to treat detention as the default posture, for certain defined offenses and offenders, unless the defense produces reliable facts showing that structured conditions of release can address appearance risk and community safety. A release order in that setting requires an affirmative judicial finding, supported by the record, not a routine adjustment of bond terms.